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Abstract
In this paper, we use a dynamic threshold panel model to investigate the impact
of classical and transition specific growth factors on the economic growth of transition
countries during 1989-2019. Following Durlauf, Johnson and Temple (2004) we use more
than 40 potential ”mainstream” growth factors and we augment the list of factors with
transition specific indicators such as privatization methods and various indicators of
institutional quality. Given the difficulty in quantifying the economic policies employed
in various countries, we explore a wide list of potential threshold variables that can
exogenously split the sample into fast and slow-growing countries. We use a range
of model specifications and both fixed effects and system GMM estimators as well as
Bayesian averaging in order to investigate the robustness of the results. In total more
than 16 million estimates are analysed. Preliminary results suggest that the most
robust results are for the initial level of development, long term effects of labor market
reforms (employment rate), the share of investment, and the importance of the natural
resources.
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1 Introduction
Most of the economists would agree that, at least in the first decade of transition, initial con-
ditions, macroeconomic stabilisation and structural reforms were key determinants of growth
in former socialist countries on their path to becoming a market economy. The consensus is
much weaker about the particular design of institutional framework and neoclassical growth
factors (Turley and Luke, 2011).
Most of the research papers that have tried to estimate growth determinants of transition
countries, due to practical and technical reasons (short time spans, availability and reliability
of data) mostly focused on informal regressions that did not control for convergence (Solow,
1956) although some aspects of neoclassical models were accounted for (Ding and Knight,
2011). As a result, as Turley and Luke (2011) point out, these studies should be treated
with caution not only due to problematic data and/or institutional proxies, but also due to
misspecifications of estimated models.
The main problem was that early models were estimated in the mid-nineties or at the
turn of the century (De Melo et al., 2001; Falcetti et al., 2002), with data covering a decade
at best. Due to data limitations it was impossible to capture the effect of the initial level of
GDP per capita on the convergence process (Solow, 1956).
Most of the empirical attention at the time was given to initial conditions of countries
in an institutional way, for example how different were countries relative to market economy
counterparts, as well as how long were the countries under the planned economy system.
Due to objective reasons, the effect of decreasing returns to physical capital did not receive
appropriate attention (Falcetti et al., 2002; Turley and Luke, 2011). Nevertheless, if we have
in mind that GDP per capita of China and Czechia in 1990 was 687 and 12659 current
international dollars respectively (The World Bank, 2020c), it becomes obvious that failure
to control for convergence can results in biased results.
Therefore, in this paper we use the augmented Solow model (1992) in order to estimate
the effects of macroeconomic stabilisation, structural reforms and institutional framework
while controlling for neoclassical growth factors such as share of investment, human capital
and the level of GDP per capita.
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Furthermore, having in mind the crucial role of labor markets reforms in transition coun-
tries, we control our estimates for the changes in employment rate and inverted age depen-
dency ratio. Conventional view is that in the long run ratio of employment to working age
population as well as age dependency ratio experience only transitory shocks. The problem
with that assumption is that empirical facts indicate that the employment rates and demo-
graphic changes (aging and migrations) were quite persistent during the last 30 years in the
transition countries.1
Following Durlauf et al. (2005) we estimate a linear and threshold dynamic model using
a variety of estimators such as fixed effects, random effects, first-difference GMM and system
GMM. Furthermore, in order to address the problem of model uncertainty, we use Bayesian
averaging technique in order to estimate posterior inclusion probabilities for the variables
that we use in the estimated models.
We regress the growth rate of real GDP per capita in local currency units on the neoclas-
sical growth factors and a vector of control variables. These contain commonly used variables
such as institutional indicators, but also less common variables such as employment rate, age
dependency rate, dependency on rents from natural resources (the ”Dutch disease”), interest
paid on public debt and the effects of the initial real exchange rate appreciation.
Our results indicate that the ratio of employment to working age population is the most
robust variable in explaining cross-country differences in GDP growth rates in transition
countries. We find evidence that share of investment, growth of population as well as initial
level of GDP per capita also have explanatory power in the majority of our estimates.
When it comes to other indicators, there is evidence of negative effects of natural re-
sources, implying ”resource course” theory. Political stability is one of the most important
institutional factors which only confirms earlier results that wars and civil unrest are detri-
mental to growth. Interest paid on public debt as an indicator of macroeconomic stability
has a robust and negative effect in the estimated models.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the existent
literature; Section 3 provides an overview of the methodology and discusses the data. In
1China has only recently liberalised it’s ”one child policy”, while EU ”Lisabon strategy” focused on
increasing employment rate to 65%, and recently the target has been increased to 70%.
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Section 4 we present the empirical results, and Section 5 concludes.
2 Survey of Literature
We organise the literature review by addressing two of the three growth research questions
put forward by Pritchett (2000). These two questions seem the most relevant in the context
of transition, and in line with Durlauf et al. (2005) they can be summarized in the following
way: (i) What are the initial, pre-transition conditions which are favorable for future growth,
and which initial conditions set off sustained future decline? (ii) How do continuous changes
in institutional and macroeconomic policies influence growth?
In theory, large initial macroeconomic and institutional distortions should be associated
with lower subsequent growth since the adjustment process is more painful and there is more
resistance regarding the transition to a market economy. This idea is confirmed by De Melo
et al. (2001), who analyse the impact of initial conditions on subsequent growth and inflation
rates in 28 transition economies. OLS and 2SLS results indicate that larger macroeconomic
distortions, such as years under central planning and repressed inflation, result in lower
growth and higher inflation in the following years. In a similar fashion, Falcetti et al. (2002)
analyse the data for 25 countries during the first 8 years of transition. 3SLS results indicate
that greater initial distortions have a strong negative effect on subsequent growth.
Though the literature confirms that the effect of higher initial distortions on growth is
negative, this impact can be expected to fade over time. This is supported by the results
of Falcetti et al. (2002), who use a methodology similar to De Melo et al. (2001) and find
the negative effect to be declining over time. Their work slightly differs from Eicher and
Schreiber (2010), who use 2SLS to analyse 26 countries during the 1991-2001 period and find
that initial conditions are significant in explaining the entire 1991-2001 growth rate. Though
their results indicate that the impact of initial conditions might be relatively long lasting, this
might be due to the strong negative influence in the earlier years of the period they examine.
For example, The World Bank (2002) analyses the performance of 25 transition countries
from 1990 to 1999 and finds that initial conditions explain 51 percent of the variance in the
average growth rate during the first five years, and a lower 41 percent of the average growth
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rate variance during the whole decade. Godoy and Stiglitz (2006)’s results show that the
impact of initial conditions is not statistically significant. Since they analyse the 1990-2001
period, this result can be interpreted as supportive towards the hypothesis of a decreasing
impact of initial conditions on growth as transition progresses.
It’s worth pointing out that the approach to measuring initial conditions used by Eicher
and Schreiber (2010) differs from the ones used by the other aforementioned authors. Namely,
they measure initial conditions using EBRD’s transition indicators, which is an approach
often found in the more recent literature. We take a similar approach in this paper since
these indicators can be used as a measure of the ongoing institutional changes, or reforms.
As a robustness check, we combine EBRD’s transition indicators with WGI data, which serve
a similar purpose.
Initial conditions do not impact growth only directly, but also indirectly, by influencing
the pace of the subsequent reforms. De Melo et al. (2001) and Falcetti et al. (2002) find
a negative connection between large initial macroeconomic distortions and the pace of the
subsequent reforms.
When it comes to addressing the second research question (the importance of institutions
and different macroeconomic variables in explaining growth), Ding and Knight (2011) and
Bonnefond (2014) identify two empirical approaches. The first one involves the estimation
of some version of the neoclassical growth model, often the augmented Solow model in a
form similar to the one found in Mankiw et al. (1992). The second approach is based on
the estimation of ad hoc, informal regressions which allow for inclusion of a broader set of
explanatory variables.
These two approaches are not very different from each other. Informal regressions fre-
quently include regressors such as gross fixed capital formation and secondary school enrol-
ment rates, which are often found among the core variables in the empirical estimations of
the augmented Solow model. Similarly, the original version of the augmented Solow model
can be expanded to include institutional variables, as suggested by Polimeni et al. (2007).
As the importance of initial conditions fades, structural reforms start playing a more
important role in determining growth, as shown in the The World Bank (2002) research.
Using system GMM with robust estimates, Josifidis et al. (2012) show that one period lags
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of structural reforms have a positive impact on growth. Their measure of structural reforms
is based on the EBRD transition indicators and its’ impact is robust across different model
specifications. Iradian (2009) uses system GMM and finds that improvements in macroeco-
nomic policies and market reforms have a positive impact on growth and explain about 50%
of the total growth in 26 transition countries he investigated during the 1991-2006 period.
When it comes to the importance of key macroeconomic variables in determining growth,
we can expect higher FDI to be linked with faster developing transition countries. FDI not
only boosts the economic activity but also enhances the transfer of knowledge from more
developed countries. Unsurprisingly, many papers (though not all of them, as, for example,
Curwin and Mahutga (2014)) find that the impact of FDI on growth is positive (Bongini
et al. (2017) and Josifidis et al. (2012)).
A higher share of general government consumption in GDP is often found to have a
negative impact on growth, as is the case in the papers of Iradian (2009) and Bongini et al.
(2017). From a theoretical perspective, these results can be supported by viewing higher
general government consumption as an indicator of a less reformed and a less efficient system.
The impact of fiscal balance on growth is somewhat ambiguous in the sense that fiscal
deficits stimulate growth when financed by external borrowing, which was very often the case
in transition countries, since new funds become available for spending in the domestic econ-
omy. Fiscal deficits, however, might also be a reflection of poor public finance management,
inefficient government investments, and reform avoidance. The empirical research points to-
wards the second explanation, with Iradian (2009) and Josifidis et al. (2012) obtaining the
result that higher fiscal surpluses have a positive impact on growth. In a similar fashion,
Çiftçioğlu and Sokhanvar (2018) conclude that higher external debt levels have a negative
impact on growth.
In line with Caselli et al. (1996) and Hoeffler (2002), the basic Solow growth model has
the following functional form:
ln(yi,t)− ln(yi,t−τ ) = −(1− e−λt)ln(yi,t−τ ) + (1− e−λt)ln(Ai,t−τ )
+ gt+ (1− e−λt) α
1− α
ln(s)− (1− e−λt) α
1− α
ln(n+ g + δ)
(1)
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Where yi,t represents output per worker in country i and period t, yi,t−τ is output per
worker in the previous period and Ai,t−τ is the level of technology in the previous period.
The rate of technological progress is represented by g, s is the savings rate, n represents the
growth rate of the workforce, δ is the depreciation rate, the share of capital in output is
represented by α and the rate of convergence to the steady state is λ. τ is the length of the
period.
The left-hand-side of the equation is the difference of logarithms of output per worker
in two subsequent periods, which approximates the growth rate of output per worker. The
basic Solow model predicts that a high savings rate will positively affect growth in output per
worker, while higher labor force growth rate, enlarged by the sum of the rate of technological
progress and the rate of depreciation, has a negative impact on the output per worker growth
rate.
In the augmented version of the Solow model investment in human capital is included as
an additional determinant of output per worker growth:
ln yi,t − ln yi,t−τ = −(1− e−φt) ln(yi,t−τ ) + (1− e−φt) ln(Ai,t−τ )
+ gt+ (1− e−φt) α
1− α− β




− (1− e−φt) α + β
1− α− β
ln(n+ g + δ)
(2)
Where sk denotes the portion of output invested in physical capital, and sh is the portion
of output invested in human capital. φ is the rate of convergence to the steady state.
3 Methodology and Data
3.1 Data
To empirically examine the relationship between various institutional and macroeconomic
variables and economic growth we used annual data for the 1989-2019 period for 32 countries.
We use two different measures of institutional indicators, transition indicators published
by EBRD (2020a) and Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) published by The World
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Bank (2020d). Both transition indicators and WGI consist of 6 different indicators.
We use The World Bank (2020c) database to obtain the data on GDP per capita PPP
(in both current and constant 2017 international dollars), GDP per capita in constant local
currency unit, total population, FDI (net inflows, % of GDP), gross fixed capital formation
(% of GDP), value added in manufacturing (% of GDP), total natural resources rents (%
of GDP), the GDP share of exports plus imports of goods and services (openness proxy),
and the price level ratio of PPP conversion factor (GDP) to the market exchange rate.
From the same database we also calculate the percentage share of interest payments in GDP
by dividing interest payments by GDP (both in current local currency units), and tourism
receipts (% GDP) by dividing international tourism receipts by GDP (both in current US$).
The employment rate is calculated as the ratio of employment to working-age population
(aged 15-64) and quasi inverted dependency rate as the ratio of working-age population to
total population, both obtained from The World Bank (2020b).
The human capital index and terms of trade (price level of exports divided by the price
level of imports) were obtained from Feenstra et al. (2015). We approximate financial sector
development by using the stock market capitalization to GDP ratio, obtained from The World
Bank (2020a)’s Global Financial Development Database.
General government expenditure data was retrieved from EBRD (2020b)’s Transition re-
ports. Data on methods of privatization of medium-sized and large enterprises is from the
study published by The World Bank (2002) titled ”Transition, The First Ten Years”. This
study lists three different privatization methods, direct sales, vouchers, and management-
employee buyout. For a particular country, each method was labeled as ”Primary”, ”Sec-
ondary” or ”n.a.” based on which of the three methods was a primary strategy for privatiza-
tion, which method was a secondary privatization strategy, and which method was not used
in a particular country.
The complete list of countries in our sample and the availability of all the aforementioned
variables for each particular country is shown in table 1.
3.2 Methodology
We estimate a linear and threshold dynamic model using the following relation:
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∆yi,t = αi + µt + β1yi,t=0 + ψXi,t + πZi,t + εi,t (3)
where yi,t is GDP per capita, yi,t=0 is the initial level of GDP per capita (proxy for
convergence), Xi,t is the vector of growth factors implied by Solow model (Solow, 1957;
Mankiw et al., 1992) and Zi,t represents growth determinants that lie outside of the original
Solow theory. Parameters αi and µt are country and time fixed effects, and small letters
denotes logs of variables xt = log(Xt).
We distinguish yi,t=0 from other Solow determinants in order to control for convergence.
Having in mind that we are working with panel data, in order to prevent our panel from
collapsing into a cross-section dataset we divide our data into five year periods. Therefore,
variable yi,t=0 represents the initial level of GDP per capita in each five year period.
Accordingly, we use five-year averages for all variables that appear as log-levels xi,t =
1/5×
∑4
n=0 xi,t−n in the estimation and we calculate five-year growth rates for all variables
that are used as log-differences in the estimation ∆xi,t = log(Xi,t)− log(Xi,t−4).
In the estimation we use both the overlapping sample and non-overlapping five-year fre-
quency.2
In order to address model uncertainty, we estimate all models using Xi,t vector of variables
and we distinguish models by alternative combinations of 2 to 24 alternative choices of
variables in the vector Zi,t (Durlauf et al., 2005).
When it comes to estimators we use the Arellano and Bond (1991) GMM estimation
method which uses moment conditions after first differencing the variables in equation (3)
and the system GMM estimator (SYS-GMM) of Arellano and Bover (1995). Given that the
bias in the longer sample will be relatively mild, we also use the usual fixed effects panel
estimator (FE). Furthermore, in order to address the issue of model uncertainty, we also
employ the Bayesian averaging technique (Magnus et al., 2010).
Following Mankiw et al. (1992) we use the share of gross fixed capital formation to GDP
mlgfcf , population growth rate dlpop and human capital mlhc in the vector Xi,t. Fur-
thermore, in order to account for population ageing and quite persistent labor market distur-
2Due to data limitations and a small number of countries in the sample, most of the results are presented
for the overlapping sample.
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bances during the transition process, we enlarge the vector Xi,t with employment to working-
age population changes dlemp and working-age population to total population changes dlrss.
The main reason for this augmentation stems from the fact that GDP per capita and
GDP per worker can deviate from each other in the case of permanent trends in employment
rate and/or age dependency rate. Therefore, we decompose GDP per capita into changes in











In the vector Zi,t we employ alternative combinations of a wide range of additional vari-
ables that are usually used in growth regressions. We use institutional factors as proxied by
EBRD’s transition indicators and the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators.
Having in mind that transition was initiated by stabilization and privatization reforms,
we also investigate the effects of these initial reforms on the long term growth trajectory. We
use two dummy variables (Pvoucher and Pdirsales) for three general types of privatization
models (voucher, direct sales, and management buyout) and we use the share of general
government expenditure in GDP mlGexp in order to account for the size of the public sector
in the economy.
We augment the growth factors with interest paid on public debt mlintpaid following
Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) and investigate the role that surge in FDI mlFDI had on eco-
nomic growth during transition process. Also, estimation is controlled for openness mlopen
and financial development mlfindev following Levine and Renelt (1992).
In order to investigate long term effects of initial quite strong real exchange rate appreci-
ation in the majority of transition countries (Égert et al., 2004; Dollar, 1992), we control our
estimates for the appreciation of absolute real exchange rate and gross wages3, as well as for
the changes in terms of trade mltot.
In order to investigate structural differences between different transition growth models,
we use the growth rate of manufacturing dlmanuf5, rents from natural resources dlrent5,
and tourism receipts dltourism5. With these variables we are trying to capture the effects
3We regress the price level and gross wages on PPP GDP per capita level and use the predicted residuals
as a proxy for the real exchange rate and unit labor cost appreciation respectively.
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of (de)industrialization and/or ”resource curse” effects on growth trajectories of transition
countries (Venables, 2016).
4 Results
The results of all estimated models are presented in tables 4 through 12. Table 4 presents
the results of 8 different models estimated with two way fixed effects estimator using the
overlapping sample. Results for the initial level of PPP GDP per capita and growth rate of
employment rate are significant in all models reflecting their robustness to model specification
uncertainty.
The growth rate of the population is significant in models 5 and 7, gross fixed capital
formation is significant in models 3 and 7, and human capital only in model 4. When it
comes to the variables from vector Zi,t, the growth rate of tourism receipts is positive and
significant, as well as price liberalization, small firms privatization, political stability, and the
rule of law.
In table 5 we present the data for the random effects estimator using the overlapping
sample. We are aware that both the assumptions of no correlation between the random effects
and explanatory variables and assumption of no autocorrelation need to be satisfied in order
for random effects model to be consistent and efficient (along with all other assumptions
related to the random effects model). However, we present the results in order to evaluate
the effects of privatization models on the growth rate of transition economies.4
According to the random effects estimate, both voucher privatization and direct sale
privatization had the same impact on the GDP growth rate as management buyouts (both
coefficients are not statistically different from zero in model 5).
FD-GMM estimate is not consistent in the presence of autocorrelation, which is by con-
struction present in the overlapping sample (Jung, 2005; Odularu and Alege, 2019). We use
overlapping samples in order to address the issue of the low number of observations, which
we believe to be more important compared with the autocorrelation issue which consequently
arises. Though the time period we analyze is longer compared with the majority of the other
4We use dummy variables for voucher privatization and direct sales without within variation. The third
type of privatization is management buyout.
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empirical literature, enough data simply does not exist yet to allow for a comfortable appli-
cation of non-overlapping samples. Table 6 shows results for the first-difference GMM model
estimate in the overlapping sample. Our FD-GMM results are in line with the results of the
two-way fixed effects model.
The estimated coefficients for the growth of employment rate and initial level of PPP
GDP per capita are robust. Models 5 through 8 have robust results for the population
growth rate as well. Gross fixed capital formation is significant only in model 3. Only
political stability, regulatory quality, voice accountability, and negative contribution of rents
from natural resources is significantly different from zero in the vector Zi,t.
Taking into account the small sample size (our N is as low as 9 in models 7 and 8), Soto
(2009) points out that system GMM has lower bias and higher efficiency compared with
both first-difference GMM and fixed effects estimators. On the other hand and similarly to
the first-difference GMM, system GMM with the overlapping sample results in inconsistent
estimates, but we believe the higher number of observations obtained by using overlapping
samples justifies this trade-off.
Table 7 presents the results for the system GMM estimator in the overlapping sample.
Once we have taken into account the level and first difference estimate using GMM, results
have changed in certain aspects. The initial level of GDP is significant again as well as
the growth of the employment rate as in other models. The difference is the fact that
the population growth rate is quite significant in all models and the gross fixed capital
formation coefficient is robustly different from zero in models 1 through 5. Rents from
natural resources have a negative effect as well as general government expenditure to GDP
ratio. Out of institutional indicators, only political stability, price liberalization, and small
scale privatization have an effect that is statistically different from zero.
In order to avoid the problem with autocorrelation in the overlapping samples, we have
estimated the fixed effects model in the non-overlapping sample as well. Usually, with overlap-
ping and non-overlapping samples there is a trade-off between ignoring the auto-correlation
problem and working with a small number of observations.
Results for the fixed effect estimate are presented in table 10. The number of observations
is small, between 125 in model 1 and 25 in model 8. In all models, the results are consistent
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with previous estimates.5
Tables 8 and 9 present threshold fixed effect model results using the overlapping sample of
data. Table 8 presents results for GDP per capita as threshold variable. The threshold value
is exogenously selected at 15,000 PPP dollars in order to separate the results into developed
and less developed economies. Unfortunately, the results are mostly driven by the lack of
data. Models 1 and 2 with 190-333 observations indicate that our results are robust for more
developed countries above the threshold, while under threshold only the initial level of GDP
per capita is a significant indicator. Once we account for continuous variables from vector
Zi,t (models 3-4), the results are much in line with the previous results. The employment rate
and the initial GDP level are important below and above the threshold value, while rents
from natural resources have a detrimental effect on GDP growth. Models 5-6 are problematic
due to a small number of countries in the models 5-6 (Figure 1g) in general and results are
only presented for comparison.
The threshold model with privatization as a threshold variable has three regimes: vouch-
ers, direct sales, and management buyout (Table 9).
Due to the model uncertainty issues related to growth regressions as described in Leamer
(1978), we proceed the analysis with the Bayesian model averaging approach (Magnus et al.,
2010). Results of the Bayesian model averaging are presented in the tables 11 and 12. Table
11 presents the mean of the estimated coefficients together with their t statistics, while table
12 presents the results for Posterior inclusion probabilities in the two way least square dummy
variable model.
We will focus our attention only on models 1 and 7, while other models are presented in
order to be comparable to the remaining tables in the paper. We have used population growth
rate, gross fixed capital formation, human capital, and initial level of GDP per capita as the
core group of variables, while all other variables are treated as part of the auxiliary vector. We
have moved growth of employment rate and the ratio of the working-age population into the
auxiliary vector in Bayesian averaging in order to estimate posterior inclusion probabilities for
these two variables as well. Having in mind that they are important in our model, although
5It was not possible to obtain FD-GMM and SYS-GMM estimates due to problems with a small number
of observations.
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they are not a part of the core model in the pure theoretical way, we find it interesting to
estimate their contribution.
The results in table 11 highlight the robustness in the importance of employment rate
and initial level of GDP per capita as well as other core variables in our model. Even
human capital, as well as gross fixed capital formation and population growth, have quite
robust results once we iterate through the entire model space. Out of auxiliary variables, the
negative contribution of rents from natural resources and share of government expenditure is
present in the data, as well as the negative contribution of large scale privatizations. Other
institutional factors with positive effects are political stability and corruption control. The
only counter-intuitive result is the negative effect of the rule of law.
When it comes to posterior inclusion probabilities (pip), table 12 presents the results for
variables in the auxiliary vector. The employment rate has the highest marginal contribution
to the goodness of fit of the regression model across all models. If we focus only on model
1 with all continuous variables, the pip value of 1.00 is estimated for rents from natural
resources and share of general government expenditure, while 0.99 is estimated for interest
paid on public debt and tourism receipts. High pip (above 0.7) is estimated for openness
as well. In the model 7 with all variables that we used in our estimate, results are similar,
political stability and employment rate have the highest marginal contribution.
5 Conclusion
This paper examines growth drivers in transition countries. We employ a variety of methods
and data sets to estimate growth factors that can explain cross-country variations in the
growth rates. Our results indicate that initial level of development, employment rate, political
stability and investment rate the most important growth factors.
The biggest contribution of the paper is the fact that changes in employment rates are
one of the most important and most robust variables in explaining growth rate variations in
transition countries. Usually, basic Solow model assumes that the labor market variations
are neutral in the long run, but when it comes to transition countries it is more than obvious
that employment to working age population ratio changes were quite significant, especially
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in the earlier years of transition.
Although the existing literature includes many empirical investigations of the determi-
nants of growth rates in transition countries, the analysis of ongoing changes is focused mostly
on institutions and macroeconomic variables among which the employment rate was not in-
cluded in any of the papers we’ve surveyed. While it is true that institutional changes are
interconnected with the changes in employment, excluding changes in employment from the
model specification leads to biased results, with the institutional indicators often taking the
credit for the growth rate changes which were actually driven by the changes in employment
rates.
This does not imply that institutional changes didn’t play a significant role in determining
transition dynamics. This is also confirmed by the significant positive impact of indicators
such as political stability on growth in some, but not all of our models. Moreover, while our
results point towards the conclusion that the most dominant determinant of GDP changes
were the changes in employment, this opens up a new question - what determined these
changes in employment? It might indeed be the case that ongoing institutional changes
were driving GDP growth rates, but this effect is indirect and comes through the impact of
institutions on the labor market and employment.
When it comes to classical growth factors, the impacts of initial level of development,
population growth and ratio of investment to GDP are robust and have theoretically expected
signs in the majority of estimates. The only exception is human capital which is significant
in only a minority of estimates.
Natural resources effect was less robust, but negative effect of the importance of rents
from natural resources on the growth rates was present in several results and methodologies.
Having in mind the estimated effect of natural resources, exploration of the structure of gross
fixed capital formation (real estate vs. vehicles and equipment) might shed additional light
on the differences in the performances of transition countries.
The most important limitation of our research is a lack of available data. In most of
the estimates we used overlapping sample in order to maximise the number of observations
per country while controlling for diminishing returns on physical capital. As a results of our
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Table 1: Data availability by country and by data source
COUNTRY (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Albania + + + + + + +
Armenia + + + + + + + +
Azerbaijan + + + + + + + +**
Belarus + + + + + + +**
Bosnia and Herzegovina + + + + + +**
Bulgaria + + + + + + + +
Cambodia + + + +
China + + + + +
Croatia + + + + + + + +
Czech Republic + + + + + + + +
Estonia + + + + + + + +
Georgia + + + + + + + +**
Germany + + + +
Hungary + + + + + + + +
Kazakhstan + + + + + + + +
Kyrgyz Republic + + + + + + + +
Lao PDR + +* + +
Latvia + + + + + + + +
Lithuania + + + + + + + +
Moldova + + + + + + + +
Montenegro + + +* + + +**
North Macedonia + + + + + +**
Poland + + + + + + + +
Romania + + + + + + + +
Russia + + + + + + + +
Serbia + + + + + +
Slovakia + + + + + + + +
Slovenia + + + + + + + +
Tajikistan + + + + + + +
Turkmenistan + + + +* + + +**
Ukraine + + + + + + + +
Uzbekistan + + + + + + +**
Vietnam + + + + +
+ indicates data is available regarding the specific country and
the specific data source. Data sources 1-9 are as follows: (1)
EBRD - Transition indicators, (2) EBRD - Transition reports, (3)
World Bank - Worldwide Governance Indicators, (4) World Bank -
Open Data, (5) World Bank - The Global Financial Development
Database, (6) World Bank - Transition, The First Ten Years, (7)
World Bank - Data Catalog, (8) Penn World Table 9.1. * marks
those countries for which all the variables from the World Bank
Open Data are available except the percentage share of interest pay-
ments in GDP. ** marks those countries for which terms of trade
data is and human capital data isn’t available
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics
(1)
count mean sd min max
dlpop5 799 .0073022 .0522305 -.1532992 .1716266
mlgfcf 859 3.119973 .2870145 1.840369 3.917758
mlhc 705 1.027402 .2116568 .3555759 1.322701
dlemp5 736 .004328 .0671688 -.2618872 .2247642
dlrss5 799 .0129248 .0274896 -.0571941 .1112796
mlintpaid 558 .0062834 1.067755 -3.651931 2.3855
mlhbs 594 -3.066352 1.059917 -7.5604 -1.156995
dlmanuf5 576 -.0556438 .2447119 -1.356 1.211427
dlrent5 686 .0270904 .7226548 -2.221039 2.930129
dltourism5 541 .1278441 .5370381 -1.480731 2.260358
mlopen 872 4.45388 .3715312 3.144847 5.23541
mlfindev 486 2.015337 1.54303 -4.386758 4.461826
mltot 937 .019036 .1103428 -.9251207 .3012387
mlFDI 823 .9787631 1.478595 -14.97883 3.613476
mlGexp 530 3.574601 .2871046 2.797992 4.12552
Pvouchers 744 .3333333 .4717216 0 1
Pdirsales 744 .3333333 .4717216 0 1
mlCompetition 833 .6018197 .4150456 0 1.300192
mlGovernance 833 .6216807 .4220288 0 1.300192
mlLprivatisation 833 .8129571 .5059259 0 1.386294
mlPliberalisation 833 1.18006 .4164345 0 1.465568
mlSprivatisation 833 1.081646 .464781 0 1.465568
mlTFsystem 833 1.042601 .5199054 0 1.465568
mlCorruptionControl 224 -1.059227 .8696381 -3.974149 .2780141
mlGovEffectiveness 290 -.948797 1.093102 -5.810862 .0897265
mlPolStability 430 -1.18608 1.181433 -7.120241 .2704797
mlRegQuality 320 -.6707374 1.027562 -3.938938 .500183
mlRuleLaw 238 -.8247187 1.01778 -3.747013 .2543054

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 4: Fixed effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
dly5 dly5 dly5 dly5 dly5 dly5 dly5 dly5
dlpop5 0.455 -0.425 -0.668 -0.449 1.123* 0.836* -0.601 -1.286*
(0.473) (0.436) (0.197) (0.622) (0.051) (0.079) (0.130) (0.053)
mlgfcf 0.095 0.128 0.185*** -0.033 0.081 0.053 -0.203** -0.169
(0.127) (0.119) (0.002) (0.716) (0.241) (0.292) (0.038) (0.327)
mlhc 0.425 0.608 0.824* 1.854** -0.044 -0.002 0.712 1.868
(0.240) (0.285) (0.052) (0.014) (0.942) (0.995) (0.103) (0.186)
dlemp5 0.446** 0.472*** 0.459*** 0.466** 0.605*** 0.543*** 0.566*** 0.616***
(0.017) (0.003) (0.004) (0.019) (0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.003)
dlrss5 1.479 -0.600 -0.013 -2.104 1.801* 1.023 0.380 1.679
(0.119) (0.491) (0.988) (0.158) (0.100) (0.211) (0.662) (0.252)
lylag5 -0.563*** -0.361*** -0.397*** -0.472*** -0.629*** -0.480*** -0.341*** -0.443***

















































cons 3.888*** 2.260*** 2.133*** 3.182* 5.078*** 3.069** 3.150*** 0.505
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.086) (0.001) (0.017) (0.000) (0.881)
N 523 313 366 243 419 432 186 104
N g 24 22 24 17 19 20 9 9
aic -1035 -969 -1079 -679 -890 -1041 -806 -539
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Table 5: Random effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
dly5 dly5 dly5 dly5 dly5 dly5 dly5 dly5
dlpop5 -0.406 -0.598*** -0.993*** -0.791* -0.105 -0.311 -1.161** -1.522***
(0.537) (0.006) (0.005) (0.055) (0.872) (0.540) (0.017) (0.000)
mlgfcf 0.098* 0.180*** 0.197*** 0.044 0.070 0.025 -0.055 -0.100
(0.054) (0.009) (0.000) (0.623) (0.289) (0.700) (0.596) (0.402)
mlhc 0.323* -0.132 0.161 0.476 0.375 0.328 0.597* 0.858***
(0.093) (0.146) (0.254) (0.177) (0.563) (0.325) (0.069) (0.003)
dlemp5 0.704*** 0.562*** 0.523*** 0.830*** 0.784*** 0.587*** 0.693*** 0.539***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
dlrss5 0.847 0.714 -0.158 -0.915 1.143 0.492 -0.184 -0.062
(0.352) (0.161) (0.813) (0.439) (0.338) (0.385) (0.699) (0.933)
lylag5 -0.218*** -0.048*** -0.166*** -0.061*** -0.246*** -0.149*** -0.300*** -0.354***

















































cons 1.117*** 0.174 0.825*** 1.169* 1.372** -0.319 2.427*** 1.615
(0.003) (0.447) (0.002) (0.099) (0.035) (0.558) (0.000) (0.542)
N 523 313 366 243 419 432 186 104
N g 24 22 24 17 19 20 9 9
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Table 6: FDGMM estimate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
dly5 dly5 dly5 dly5 dly5 dly5 dly5 dly5
dlpop5 1.047** 0.295 0.252 0.419 1.592** 1.235** -0.866* -1.286
(0.039) (0.542) (0.613) (0.672) (0.017) (0.038) (0.063) (0.111)
mlgfcf -0.020 0.152** 0.026 0.159 0.026 0.045 -0.145 -0.169
(0.625) (0.045) (0.589) (0.238) (0.623) (0.403) (0.198) (0.437)
mlhc 0.496 0.678 0.868* 1.385* 0.090 0.275 0.259 1.868
(0.160) (0.184) (0.054) (0.063) (0.850) (0.558) (0.659) (0.288)
dlemp5 0.297*** 0.419*** 0.391** 0.301 0.344*** 0.358*** 0.475** 0.616**
(0.005) (0.007) (0.016) (0.144) (0.004) (0.004) (0.011) (0.010)
dlrss5 0.761 -1.308 -0.737 -2.068 1.356* 0.710 0.340 1.679
(0.218) (0.198) (0.386) (0.165) (0.096) (0.443) (0.772) (0.361)
lylag5 -0.815*** -0.620*** -0.652*** -0.780*** -0.895*** -0.864*** -0.431*** -0.443**

















































N 499 288 342 226 400 412 177 95
N g 24 22 23 17 19 20 9 9
sargan 795 304 331 319 559 393 270 112
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Table 7: SYS-GMM estimate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
dly5 dly5 dly5 dly5 dly5 dly5 dly5 dly5
dlpop5 -0.969** -0.581** -0.616* -0.785* -1.092** -1.059** -1.136* -1.522***
(0.030) (0.017) (0.093) (0.090) (0.026) (0.018) (0.056) (0.002)
mlgfcf 0.195*** 0.180** 0.194*** 0.039 0.122** 0.007 -0.060 -0.100
(0.002) (0.016) (0.002) (0.667) (0.012) (0.914) (0.593) (0.502)
mlhc -0.075 -0.137 -0.060 0.517 0.132 0.256 0.638 0.858**
(0.322) (0.169) (0.625) (0.204) (0.646) (0.265) (0.107) (0.037)
dlemp5 0.924*** 0.579*** 0.643*** 0.815*** 0.941*** 0.693*** 0.672*** 0.539***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.003) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000)
dlrss5 0.271 0.705 -0.555 -0.991 1.080 0.628 -0.292 -0.063
(0.805) (0.239) (0.400) (0.468) (0.403) (0.423) (0.624) (0.945)
lylag5 -0.095*** -0.047** -0.101*** -0.069* -0.072* -0.048 -0.323*** -0.354***

















































cons 0.208 0.000 0.000 1.193 -0.077 0.000 2.775*** 0.000
(0.435) (.) (.) (0.128) (0.827) (.) (0.000) (.)
N 523 313 366 243 419 432 186 104
N g 24 22 24 17 19 20 9 9
sargan 3052 1167 1069 1079 3294 1879 883 116
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Table 8: Threshold fixed effect model (GDP PPP as threshold variable)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
¡threshold ¿threshold ¡threshold ¿threshold ¡threshold ¿threshold
dlpop5 0.349 1.825*** -3.464 -0.774 -6.553*** -0.985
(0.695) (0.003) (0.245) (0.370) (0.000) (0.236)
mlgfcf -0.036 0.027 0.126 -0.009 -0.733*** -0.131
(0.673) (0.811) (0.759) (0.958) (0.000) (0.361)
mlhc 0.119 1.482*** 5.284 3.197 7.657*** 5.887***
(0.762) (0.000) (0.221) (0.109) (0.000) (0.003)
dlemp5 0.322 0.651*** 0.781* 0.705*** 0.564*** 0.427*
(0.143) (0.000) (0.050) (0.000) (0.000) (0.075)
dlrss5 1.110 -0.684 -3.378 -0.536 13.411*** -1.196
(0.157) (0.192) (0.541) (0.586) (0.000) (0.681)
lylag5 -0.657*** -0.450*** -0.753* -0.210** 0.000 -0.372**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.070) (0.026) (.) (0.042)
mlintpaid 0.077 -0.060 0.212*** 0.028
(0.442) (0.187) (0.000) (0.656)
mlhbs -0.148 -0.026 0.134*** 0.065
(0.374) (0.265) (0.000) (0.185)
dlmanuf5 -0.204 -0.034 -0.153*** 0.029
(0.518) (0.751) (0.000) (0.749)
dlrent5 -0.026 -0.038** 0.016*** -0.026
(0.380) (0.013) (0.000) (0.168)
dltourism5 0.016 0.023 -0.055*** -0.051*
(0.165) (0.275) (0.000) (0.052)
mlopen 0.186 0.341* -0.164*** 0.501
(0.456) (0.093) (0.000) (0.230)
mlfindev -0.162 0.029 -0.273*** -0.078**
(0.251) (0.323) (0.000) (0.033)
mltot -0.277 -0.871 -0.614*** 2.648**
(0.881) (0.176) (0.000) (0.049)
mlFDI -0.164 -0.095** -0.247*** -0.051
(0.306) (0.031) (0.000) (0.234)
mlGexp -0.156 0.442 -0.451*** 0.417





























cons 5.081*** 2.599*** 0.687 -4.548 -8.989*** 17.319
(0.000) (0.000) (0.927) (0.259) (0.000) (0.537)
N 333 190 38 91 27 77
N g 24 15 9 13 7 9
aic -687 -759 -254 -438 . -440
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Table 9: Threshold fixed effect model (Privatisation model as threshold variable)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Buyout Dir.Sale Vouchers Buyout Dir.Sale Vouchers
dlpop5 -0.242 0.833 0.271*** -2.064** -0.193 -10.234
(0.825) (0.340) (0.003) (0.023) (0.891) (.)
mlgfcf 0.499 0.208 -1.652*** -1.383*** 0.243 0.428
(0.518) (0.102) (0.000) (0.010) (0.372) (.)
mlhc 2.882 -0.134 14.298*** 0.671 1.940 -30.899
(0.425) (0.891) (0.000) (0.385) (0.583) (.)
dlemp5 0.148 0.601*** 1.174*** 1.316** 0.937** 0.352
(0.556) (0.001) (0.000) (0.034) (0.013) (.)
dlrss5 -3.914* -0.759 -1.588*** 34.651*** 1.724 28.194
(0.063) (0.553) (0.000) (0.000) (0.436) (.)
mlintpaid 0.137* 0.019 0.100*** -1.375** 0.009 1.408
(0.062) (0.694) (0.000) (0.012) (0.930) (.)
mlhbs 0.020 0.029 0.031*** 0.312** 0.068 0.228
(0.785) (0.227) (0.000) (0.018) (0.267) (.)
dlmanuf5 -0.218 -0.167 -0.577*** 0.853*** -0.212 0.695
(0.345) (0.150) (0.000) (0.003) (0.288) (.)
dlrent5 -0.013 -0.051*** -0.041*** -0.080** -0.015 -0.016
(0.773) (0.001) (0.000) (0.038) (0.529) (.)
dltourism5 0.145 0.040* -0.102*** -0.308** 0.044 -0.401
(0.273) (0.079) (0.000) (0.013) (0.359) (.)
mlopen 0.059 0.141 -1.196*** -1.254** 0.250 1.902
(0.963) (0.359) (0.000) (0.050) (0.789) (.)
mlfindev -0.064 -0.065 0.096*** 0.269** -0.070 0.797
(0.771) (0.102) (0.000) (0.010) (0.460) (.)
mltot -0.680 -0.088 -2.664*** 8.849*** -1.479 4.958
(0.747) (0.843) (0.000) (0.005) (0.374) (.)
mlFDI 0.005 -0.080*** 0.066*** -0.247** -0.126* -0.304
(0.973) (0.002) (0.000) (0.014) (0.081) (.)
mlGexp 0.485 -0.500*** -0.973*** 0.274 -0.267 0.000
(0.331) (0.002) (0.000) (0.127) (0.622) (.)
lylag5 -0.598 -0.450*** -0.508*** 0.000 -0.290 0.000
(0.498) (0.003) (0.000) (.) (0.286) (.)
Pvouchers 0.000 0.000 0.000
(.) (.) (.)
Pdirsales 0.000 0.000 0.000
(.) (.) (.)
mlCompetition -0.673** 0.073 0.000
(0.047) (0.893) (.)
mlGovernance -1.894** -0.134 0.000
(0.014) (0.786) (.)
mlLprivatisation -2.745** 0.621 0.000
(0.028) (0.396) (.)
mlPliberalisation 14.682** 1.007 0.000
(0.029) (0.489) (.)
mlSprivatisation -4.845** -0.184 0.000
(0.016) (0.940) (.)
mlTFsystem 3.702*** 0.155 0.000
(0.001) (0.973) (.)
mlCorruptionControl 0.000 0.010 0.000
(.) (0.910) (.)
mlGovEffectiveness 0.000 -0.056 0.000
(.) (0.672) (.)
mlPolStability 0.000 0.028 0.000
(.) (0.561) (.)
mlRegQuality 0.000 -0.022 0.000
(.) (0.974) (.)
mlRuleLaw 0.000 -0.072 0.000
(.) (0.816) (.)
mlVoiceAccountability 0.000 0.400 0.000
(.) (0.665) (.)
cons -1.073 5.335*** 1.839*** -4.045 -1.859 24.893
(0.935) (0.007) (0.000) (0.121) (0.909) (.)
N 36 71 22 23 65 16
N g 4 7 3 2 5 2
aic -258 -387 . . -388 .
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Table 10: Fixed effects in the non-overlapping sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
dly5 dly5 dly5 dly5 dly5 dly5 dly5 dly5
dlpop5 0.104 -1.177 -1.090* -0.466 0.644 -0.127 -1.725 -0.077***
(0.852) (0.149) (0.069) (0.676) (0.296) (0.743) (0.115) (0.000)
mlgfcf 0.121** 0.169 0.218*** 0.088 0.101 0.054 0.252 0.248***
(0.030) (0.166) (0.004) (0.432) (0.107) (0.333) (0.212) (0.000)
mlhc 0.468 0.644 0.795 2.415** 0.049 0.268 3.238 -1.207***
(0.202) (0.462) (0.132) (0.020) (0.941) (0.516) (0.105) (0.000)
dlemp5 0.660*** 0.615*** 0.594*** 0.604** 0.744*** 0.561*** 0.812*** 1.303***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.021) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000)
dlrss5 0.229 -0.975 -0.435 -3.786* 0.193 -0.487 -2.603* 2.824***
(0.830) (0.410) (0.529) (0.091) (0.881) (0.607) (0.061) (0.000)
lylag5 -0.375*** -0.334** -0.364*** -0.521** -0.448*** -0.295*** -0.750** 0.000

















































cons 2.417* 1.907** 1.903** 2.819 3.581** 1.251 2.638** 1.490***
(0.059) (0.025) (0.016) (0.328) (0.040) (0.197) (0.035) (0.000)
N 115 71 82 61 92 96 43 25
N g 24 21 22 17 19 20 9 9
aic -261 -198 -257 -150 -216 -251 -163 .
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Table 11: Bayesian averaging least square dummy variable model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
dly5 dly5 dly5 dly5 dly5 dly5 dly5
dlpop5 -0.910** -0.474 -0.573** -0.255 0.882*** -0.589** -1.858***
(-2.26) (-1.54) (-2.43) (-0.80) (4.01) (-2.58) (-4.80)
mlgfcf 0.151** 0.113*** 0.188*** -0.051 0.042* -0.186*** -0.207***
(2.22) (3.04) (7.56) (-1.36) (1.69) (-3.79) (-3.11)
mlhc -0.353 0.501** 0.805*** 1.944*** -0.009 0.950*** 1.118**
(-0.63) (2.21) (4.12) (4.76) (-0.04) (3.07) (2.46)
lylag5 -0.368*** -0.348*** -0.401*** -0.468*** -0.474*** -0.343*** -0.486***
(-4.59) (-8.35) (-11.85) (-8.57) (-15.21) (-9.04) (-5.96)
dlemp5 0.570*** 0.477*** 0.463*** 0.457*** 0.537*** 0.569*** 0.556***
(8.90) (8.01) (7.96) (4.94) (7.63) (10.11) (7.31)
dlrss5 -0.017 -0.079 -0.001 -1.450 0.920* 0.058 0.023
(-0.06) (-0.33) (-0.01) (-1.56) (1.77) (0.29) (0.07)
mlintpaid -0.076*** -0.041*** -0.008
(-3.81) (-3.70) (-0.36)
mlhbs -0.010 -0.000 -0.002
(-0.60) (-0.19) (-0.21)
dlmanuf5 -0.024 -0.001 -0.190***
(-0.52) (-0.13) (-3.00)
dlrent5 -0.040*** -0.006 -0.004
(-3.94) (-0.70) (-0.43)
dltourism5 0.052*** 0.039*** -0.000
(3.67) (4.25) (-0.07)
mlopen 0.130 -0.077 0.003
(1.36) (-1.12) (0.11)
mlfindev 0.005 0.044*** -0.000
(0.43) (4.58) (-0.04)
mltot -0.020 -0.036 0.003
(-0.19) (-0.31) (0.03)
mlFDI -0.008 -0.000 -0.041**
(-0.54) (-0.03) (-2.31)


























cons 4.169*** 2.473*** 2.290*** 2.333*** 3.371*** 3.042*** 4.772***
(2.92) (6.15) (6.13) (3.12) (7.88) (7.07) (4.62)
N 129 313 366 243 432 186 104
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Table 12: Posterior inclusion probabilities in the least square dummy variable model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
dly5 dly5 dly5 dly5 dly5 dly5 dly5
pip pip pip pip pip pip pip
dlemp5 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
dlrss5 0.09 0.14 0.05 0.80 0.84 0.13 0.07
mlintpaid 0.99 0.99 0.17
mlhbs 0.34 0.08 0.08
dlmanuf5 0.29 0.06 0.94
dlrent5 1.00 0.40 0.20
dltourism5 0.99 1.00 0.05
mlopen 0.74 0.64 0.06
mlfindev 0.22 1.00 0.05
mltot 0.11 0.14 0.05
mlFDI 0.31 0.06 0.90













N 129 313 366 243 432 186 104
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Figure 1: Number of observations per country in the analysis
(a) Model 1 & 3 (b) Model 2 (c) Model 4 (d) Model 5
(e) Model 6 (f) Model 7 (g) Model 8
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